

ADMIRAL TURNER'S SPEECH FILES

9 MAY 1973

REMARKS TO YALE STUDENTS, by STANSFIELD
TURNER

NAVY review(s) completed.

Approved For Release 2003/04/18 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003600030001-3

REMARKS TO YALE STUDENTS 9 MAY 1973

HIGHER EDUCATION IN THE NAVY - WHY - HOW

INTEREST TO ALL OF YOU

MIRRORS THE CHANGES AND TRENDS

WE WORK WITH MID CAREER - LCDR/CDR - ALL SERVICES

BACKGROUND OF OPERATIONAL EXPERIENCE COMMANDS -

SINGLE UNITS

DIVISION OFFICER

STAFF ASSIGNMENTS

SMALLER ONES CONFINED TO ONE TYPE

BACKGROUND OF EDUCATIONAL EXPERIENCE

RATIONAL NEWTONIAN UNIVERSE

AUTHORITARIAN CHAIN OF COMMAND

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TECHNICAL ENVIRONMENT

2

EDUCATIONAL EXPERIENCE

TRAINING OUT IN THE FLEET

NOT CRITICIZING

SUGGEST AS OFFICERS MOVE UP THE LADDER NEED CHANGE -
OUTLOOK

MULTIPLE UNIT COMMANDS E.G. A/C WING

LARGER COMMANDS MORE COORDINATED OPERATIONS

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MUST GET OFFICERS TO RECOGNIZE THE SUBTLETIES, THE UNCERTAINTIES,
THE INEXACTNESS OF THE DECISION PROCESS

NEW CURRICULUM

START BY DISCUSSING STRATEGY

DEVICE OF MILITARY HISTORY

DISSECT DECISIONS OF STRATEGISTS OF THE PAST

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THUCYDIDES

"HOW IN THE WORLD CAN THIS BE RELEVANT TO
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ANALOGIES ARE OBVIOUS - WHAT INFLUENCED DECISIONS

ISSUES OF WHETHER TO SEND A CAMPAIGN OVERSEAS,

WHETHER TO FOLLOW A MARITIME STRATEGY

GRAPPLED WITH FOR MANY YEARS

FUNDAMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS HAVE NOT CHANGED

STUDIED FRENCH REVOLUTIONARY AND NAPOLEONIC WARS

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IMPACT OF LEVÉE EN MASSE

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PARALLELS TO VN

WHAT TOTAL WAR MEANS TODAY?

✓ B. 22

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MANAGEMENT MORE THAN EVER BEFORE MANAGERS

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WHAT ATTEMPTING - RESHAPE THINKING HABITS OF MEN OF ACCOMPLISHMENT

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WHOLE IDEA IS RISKY BUSINESS

LOSE THEIR BEARINGS IN A NEW WORLD OF UNCERTAINTY AND INEXACTNESS

WHY ACCEPTING ----- THESE RISKS

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IF ANYTHING OUR INTERESTS ARE GROWING FOR 4 REASONS:

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2. GROWING INTERDEPENDENCE ON RAW MATERIALS - E.G. OIL - *EXPLORATION*
3. GROWING NEED INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION ENVIRONMENTAL
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SEEMS TO ME BERNARD BRODIE INTERPRETS BEST SAYS -

"THAT WAR TAKES PLACE WITHIN A POLITICAL MILIEU FROM
WHICH IT DERIVES ALL ITS PURPOSE."

WHEN WAR HAPPENS CAN'T MAKE SENSE WITHOUT AN OBJECT -

(NAPOLEON - OBJECTLESS WAR)

HOW WELL DID DEFINE PURPOSE FOR WHICH FIGHTING IN VN?

COME TO WW I - ASKED SAME?

WHERE WAS PURPOSE? WHAT WERE ORIGINS?

WANTED TO LOOK AT HOW WAR CAN ARRIVE NOT AS A RESULT OF
RATIONAL DECISIONS BUT AS A COLLAPSE OF POLICY

WHY COULDN'T STOP?

READ THE GENERAL - FORESTER

WHAT MAKES UP A PROFESSIONAL MILITARY MAN?

FORESTER - NOT PORTRAY HIS GENERAL AS VENAL - STUPID

YET ALL WRONG DECISIONS

WHEN OFFENSIVE TACTICS WERE FAILING - MORE & BETTER WOULD SURELY
SUCCEED AGAINST ANY DEFENSE

WHEN ON DEFENSIVE - CERTAIN IMPREGNABLE

WHAT CAUSES? FUNCTION OF MILITARY TRAINING - DISCIPLINE

IF SO WHAT ABOUT CIVILIAN LEADER AND EVEN PRESS - SUPPORTED
GENERAL

ALSO LOOKED THIS REGARD AT YALE'S OWN E. E. MORISON-

MEN, MACHINES - - -

WM. SIMS - GUNNERY - ROOSEVELT

BUREAUCRACY

WAMPANOAG - 1866 - 20 KTS

LACK OF PURPOSE

WAS MAHAN RIGHT? MORISON - NO CHANGE FROM INSIDE

ANY SOCIETY RESISTS CHANGE

MILITARY A SMALL SOCIETY

IF SO WHERE DO WE GET IMPETUS?

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DON'T KNOW - DO KNOW NOT WILLING GIVE UP ATTEMPTING NOT TO BE GENERALS

AS FORESTORS - NOT TO BE A BUREAUCRACY THAT DIMS A SIMS

ONLY WAY TO AVOID IS TO TAKE MY NEWTONIAN STUDENTS -

EXPOSE TO EXPERIENCE IN INTENSE LOGICAL THINKING

AND REASONING.

EXPOSE TO A QUEST FOR ALL FACTORS INVOLVED IN DECISIONS -

A QUEST FOR OBJECTIVITY

USE HISTORY - 2 REASONS

1. REDUCE EMOTIONAL ELEMENT

BLOCKADE

HAIPHONG

EFFECTIVE - HUMANE

NO ONE KILLED

AGRARIAN ECONOMY -

CUT OFF WAR MAKING ONLY

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2. USING HISTORY BECAUSE UNDERSTANDING CHANGE ESSENTIAL -

WANT PREPARE STUDENTS FOR CHANGE - HISTORIAN STOCK IN TRADE

DESCRIBE CHANGE

POLITICAL SCIENTISTS -

LOOK EXISTING DATA AND PROJECT INTO FUTURE -

RIGHT AND WRONG STUDENTS LIKELY TO GRAB TOO EASILY

AUTHORITATIVE ANSWERS E.G. MULTI-POLAR WORLD

SAME TIME WARN AGAINST DANGERS OF FACILE HISTORICAL ANALOGIES -

SO CALLED LESSONS OF HISTORY -

HOW FAR WERE ANGLO-FRENCH APPEASEMENT POLICIES IN

THE LATE 1930'S AN EFFORT TO AVOID WW I

AS YOUR OWN GADDIS SMITH NOTES, HOW FAR WAS THE U.S.
POLICY OF CONTAINMENT IN 1940'S AN EFFORT TO AVOID WW II
NO ILLUSION HISTORY REPEATS

IMPORTANT SEE HOW STATESMEN, GENERALS, ADMIRALS DELT WITH
STRATEGY AND POLICY IN THE PAST
SEE WHERE SUCCEEDED
SEE WHERE FAILED
SEE WHERE CONDITIONS BEYOND CONTROL

LOOKING FOR LESSONS-PRINCIPLES FROM THESE CASES
DRAW ON IN CASES OF TOMORROW

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NOT FACTS - CURRENT STATUS - THINKING PROCESS

THINK IT OUT FOR HIMSELF

FIVE HOURS A WEEK -

THOUSAND PAGES - ESSAYS

GIVE THEM ENOUGH LATITUDE TO EXPLORE

FORCED TO DO THE DIGGING

FUTURE THEY ARE GOING TO HAVE TO DIG

FACTS NOT LIKELY TO REMAIN SO

BUT THE PRINCIPLES AND

THE PROCESS OF THINKING AND REASONING WILL

MANAGEMENT MORE THAN EVER BEFORE MANAGERS

DECISIONS OF CHOICE - HOW BUY NAVY TO MEET STRATEGY

BILLION DOLLARS 5 DLGN VS 20 DE OR 2 AND 12

HOW DO WE DECIDE ON THAT MIX?

NOT AS PRECISE AS SOLVING TECHNICAL PROBLEMS

WHAT ATTEMPTING TO PRODUCE IN MANAGEMENT

OFFICERS COMBINE THE TECHNIQUES OF THE PHYSICAL SCIENCES

INEXACTNESS AND APPROXIMATION SOCIAL SCIENCES

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LAST PART OF OUR CURRICULUM

TACTICS - HOW OPERATE NAVY BOUGHT TO FULFILL STRATEGY

COMBINE THE TECHNIQUES OF PRECISE CALCULATION WITH APPROXIMATE
ANALYSIS

TACTICS IS SYSTEMATIC - BUT

ENDS UP WITH PROBABILITIES, RATHER THAN PRECISENESS

CIRCUMSTANCE A

CIRCUMSTANCE B

TEACH THE STUDENTS TO BE SYSTEMATIC AND LOGICAL

GUESSES WILL BE MORE THAN THAT

DERIVE TACTICS

PLAY LONG RUN

WHAT ATTEMPTING - RESHAPE THINKING HABITS OF MEN OF ACCOMPLISHMENT

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SOMEWHAT REVERSE OF GRAD SCHOOL

NARROWING FOCUS -

COMPETENCE IN SPECIALIZED AREA

VS.

BROADENING HORIZONS OF SPECIALISTS OF PROVEN COMPETENCE

COMMANDED SHIPS

FLOWN AIRCRAFT IN COMBAT

TORTURE IN PRISON CAMPS

MANAGED \$M PROGRAMS

PRINCIPALLY - ATTEMPTING MAKE RECOGNIZE UNCERTAINTY -

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INEXACTNESS OF REAL WORLD

WHOLE IDEA IS RISKY BUSINESS

LOSE THEIR BEARINGS IN A NEW WORLD OF UNCERTAINTY AND INEXACTNESS

WHY ACCEPTING / THESE RISKS

PROUD TO HAVE BEEN IN THE MID-CAREER EDUCATION BUSINESS SINCE 1884

WILLING TO EXPERIMENT - CHANGING TIMES

WORLD OF THE MILITARY OF THE 1970'S

DEMANDS FOR HIGHER INTELLECTUAL STANDARDS

GREATER COMPETITIVENESS

WHY? GENTLEMANLY FRATERNAL SPIRIT IS WANING

MUST BE ABLE TO PRESENT OUR CASE IN A MORE CONVINCING MANNER

CLOSER SCRUTINY

FAILURE TO MAKE CASE COULD EVEN LEAD COUNTRY

INTO A REPETITION OF ITS REJECTION OF MILITARY PREPAREDNESS

AS IN 1920'S AND 1930'S

MORE SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES

1. POSITION AND RESPONSIBILITIES
2. NUCLEAR WEAPONS
3. PEACE TIME BALANCE OF MILITARY FORCES

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FOR INSTANCE - BELIEVE WE ARE CONFUSING A RECOGNITION OF THE LIMITS

OF OUR POWER WITH NEED TO REDEFINE OUR NATIONAL INTERESTS -

NATIONAL INTERESTS - VITAL INTERESTS -

NOT SOMETHING CAN BE MEASURED OBJECTIVELY - OR EVEN DEFINED

GEOGRAPHICALLY -

MEASURE IN TERMS OF PRICE OF EXERCISING OUR INTEREST

HOGWASH - SAY NO LONGER HAVE NATIONAL INTEREST IN SE ASIA -

OR IN VAST OTHER AREAS OF WORLD

AS SEEMS POPULAR TO CONTEND TODAY

IF ANYTHING OUR INTERESTS ARE GROWING FOR 4 REASONS:

1. GROWING ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIPS SUCH MULTI-NATIONAL CORPORATION -
2. GROWING INTERDEPENDENCE ON RAW MATERIALS - E.G. OIL
3. GROWING NEED INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION ENVIRONMENTAL
CONTROL, PREVENTION OF ACTS OF TERRORISM,
REGULATION OF EXPLORATION AND DEVELOPMENT
OF LAST FRONTIERS - ICEABS AND SPACE

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4. SECURITY VIEWPOINT - BOUND HAVE INTEREST IN BOTH ECONOMIC

AND POLITICAL HAPPENINGS AROUND WORLD

CAN NOT HIDE BEHIND OUR OCEAN RAMPARTS

MODERN WEAPONS TOO SWIFT POWERFUL AND LONG RANGE

WHERE WE WANT INTERVENE IF TOTALITARIAN REGIMES OR REGIMES THAT

ARE AGGRESSIVELY OPPOSED TO US ECONOMICALLY, MILITARILY OR

DIPLOMATICALLY TAKE HOLD IS THE ISSUE

ANALOGY TO LAW AND ORDER IN THE COMMUNITY

CLEAR - NO LONGER HAVE THE POWER DOMINATE WORLD SCENE AS
DID MUCH 1ST 2 DECADES WW II
CERTAINLY DO NOT HAVE MILITARY POWER AT LEAST
ECONOMIC PREEMINENCE ALSO SUBSIDED
SO COSTS US RELATIVELY MORE TO DISPLAY AN INTEREST OVERSEAS
IN THAT SENSE WHAT'S VITAL MAY BE DIFFERENT TODAY

BUT - LET US BE CAREFUL BEFORE REDEFINING OUR INTERESTS TO MATCH
OUR CHANGING POWER STATUS

ARE WE USING OUR POWER TO BEST ADVANTAGE?

ALL FORMS -

MILITARY

ECONOMIC

DIPLOMATIC

MORAL

PSYCHOLOGICAL

ALLIES

IF WE ARE MORE CLEVER - AS BRITISH - IF WE INTEGRATE OUR TOTAL
POWER BETTER - NOT JUST MILITARY - PERHAPS WE CAN AFFORD TO
PROTECT MORE OF OUR INTERESTS THAN THINK

FORCING US TO DEVELOP OFFICERS WHO ARE ARTICULATE

RATIONAL THINKERS

PEOPLE - THINK THROUGH WHAT MILITARY PURPOSES ARE RATHER THAN

RELY ON CLICHES

PEOPLE - PREPARE TO DETER THE NEXT WAR - NOT LAST

PEOPLE - WILL ASK ONLY FOR HARDWARE THAT WE NEED

PEOPLE - UNDERSTAND HOW MILITARY POWER RELATES TO TOTAL

NATIONAL POWER -

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OF COURSE, NOT OUR JOB TO DECIDE

SIZE/SHAPE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT COUNTRY NEEDS

YOU, CITIZENS THROUGH CONGRESS

GREAT RESPONSIBILITY ON MILITARY

PICTURE LUCIDLY

LEST MAKE DECISION ON ONE SIDE EQUATION

FROM THIS MY FEELING ... MORE DEMANDING

CULTIVATING INTELLECTUAL CAPACITY

NAVA- LEADERS OF TOMORROW